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I. INTRODUCTION
We should applaud the sentiment behind Nils Jareborg's decision to examine
principles designed to limit the scope of the criminal sanction. Apart from a
preoccupation with whether the harm principle should be included in a theory of
criminalization, Anglo-American theorists have tended to focus almost exclusively
on doctrines in the general part. Although the boundaries of the general part are
enormously controversial, issues of criminalization are generally located beyond
them.' I take Jareborg at his word when he writes that "it is often-in fact, very
often-claimed that criminalization is the legislator's ultima ratio."2  It is
noteworthy, however, that Andrew Ashworth is the only scholar in the Anglo-
American world who is said to endorse this principle.3 Nearly all of the authorities
cited by Jareborg are continental. Why Anglo-American theorists are less likely to
defend principles to limit the reach of the criminal sanction than their European
counterparts presents a fascinating question in comparative criminal theory I lack
the competence to explore.
Without a theory to constrain the scope of the criminal law, rampant
overcriminalization (or what Jareborg calls inflation) has resulted.4 The criminal
law has grown far beyond its core, and now includes a plethora of offenses
Professor of Philosophy, Rutgers University.
But see Douglas Husak, Limitations on Criminalization and the General Part of Criminal
Law in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 13 (Stephen Shute & A.P.
Simester, eds., 2002).
2 Nils Jareborg, Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio), 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521,
523 (2004).
3 Actually, Ashworth does not endorse the last resort principle explicitly, but expresses his
commitment to minimalism in the criminal law. Although the details of minimalism are sketchy,
Ashworth indicates that "the decision [to criminalize] should not be taken without an assessment of..
• the possibility of tackling the problem by other forms of regulation and control." ANDREW
ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 67-68 (3rd ed. 1999). Jareborg also mentions ANDREW
SIMESTER & G.R. SULLIVAN, CRIMINAL LAW, THEORY AND DOCTRINE (2000). They write: "[Criminal
censures] should not be deployed merely as a tool of convenience, and where possible other forms of
social control ought to be used in their stead." Id. at 11. Jareborg's remarks have led me to elaborate
on the last resort principle at greater length. See Douglas Husak, The Criminal Law as Last Resort,
24 OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 207 (2004).
4 William Stuntz maintains that "anyone who studies contemporary state or federal codes is
likely to be struck by their scope, by the sheer amount of conduct they render punishable." See
William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 515 (2001).
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"undreamed of by the drafters of the Model Penal Code." 5 What can be done to
reverse this trend? The last resort principle may seem to offer the potential to
dramatically narrow the reach of the criminal sanction. Like Jareborg, however, I
am pessimistic that this principle would prove very effective in achieving this
result. My emphasis throughout this paper is on difficulties that arise in applying
the last resort principle. In Part I, I will provide a somewhat abstract defense of
my skeptical position. In Part II, I will illustrate my general reservations with a
specific example-the case of drug proscriptions. I will conclude that the last
resort principle is less helpful than theorists might have anticipated in combating
the intractable problem of overcriminalization.
II. GENERAL REASONS TO BELIEVE THE PRINCIPLE IS UNHELPFUL
Suppose we try to apply the last resort principle to existing criminal law.
Presumably, we cannot begin to do so without understanding the objective of penal
legislation. Unless we are able to identify this objective, we are in no position to
decide whether given alternatives are better or worse at attaining it. This issue
plunges us directly into some of the deepest quagmires of criminal theory.
Philosophers agree that the criminal law has a purpose, but disagree radically
about what that purpose is.
Suppose we believe that the sole objective of the criminal law is to prevent
whatever conduct has been criminalized. This belief gives rise to what might be
called the preventive interpretation of the last resort principle: the criminal law
should be used only as a last resort to prevent given kinds of conduct. If
noncriminal means prevent the conduct in question as well or better than criminal
sanctions, the criminal law should not be employed. The preventive interpretation
of the last resort principle suggests that we perform a thought-experiment in which
we compare two jurisdictions that differ in only one respect: the first includes an
offense proscribing a given kind of conduct, while the second employs noncriminal
means of prevention. If fewer (or as many) instances of the type of conduct occur
in the latter world, the penal sanction would not be justified. As so construed, one
would expect the implementation of the last resort principle to require a laborious,
case-by-case determination of the relative advantages and disadvantages of
criminal and noncriminal approaches to given problems.
But the preventive interpretation of the last resort principle is problematic for
at least two distinct reasons. First, this interpretation is jeopardized if the criminal
law has central functions other than prevention. Many, and probably most,
theorists believe that the criminal law has additional objectives. Joel Feinberg has
5 Gerald E. Lynch, Towards A Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The Challenge of the
Special Part, 2 BUFF. CRiM. L. REv. 297, 299 (1998). For further thoughts about how this expansion
might be retarded, see Douglas Husak, Crimes Outside the Core, 39 TULSA L. REv. 755 (2004).
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persuasively argued that punishment has an expressive function.6 Although
expressive views are typically advanced as theories of punishment, they also have
profound implications for the content of the substantive criminal law itself-for
issues of criminalization. The reason should be clear.7  Punishments must be
justified, and justified punishments must be deserved. Persons deserve the censure
inherent in punishment only if their conduct merits this response. 8  If so,
expressive theories have implications for criminalization as well as for
punishment.
Expressive theories are incompatible with the preventive interpretation of the
last resort principle. This version of the principle states that noncriminal
alternatives should be employed when they are as good or better at preventing
given kinds of conduct. Once we understand that the criminal law has both
preventive and expressive functions, we need to provide a new interpretation of the
last resort principle. Even though other modes of social control may do a better
job reducing the incidence of criminality, they may fail to achieve an indispensable
objective of the criminal sanction: expressing censure. To decide whether
alternatives to the criminal law are equally effective, we would have to evaluate
not only their ability to reduce crime, but also their efficacy as expressions. 9
Of course, the last resort principle could be applied to the expressive function
of the criminal law as well as to its preventive function. According to this
suggestion, conduct should be criminalized only when no alternative device
conveys condemnation as well or better. If punishment were the only way to
express censure, we could agree that criminalization would be the sole means to
attain this function of the criminal law. On this assumption, the last resort
principle would never provide a good reason to repeal (or not to enact) an offense
designed to stigmatize. The last resort principle would not become false; it would
become trivial and unimportant in a theory of criminalization, and could not retard
the trend toward enacting too many offenses. Its application to the criminal law
would achieve nothing that was not already accomplished by insisting that crime
6 Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING 95
(1970).
7 Although the reason should be clear, philosophers who have struggled to justify
punishment have not always traced the implications of their views for the substantive criminal law.
For further thoughts, see Douglas Husak, Reflective Equilibrium between Punishment and Crime, in
FLORES JURIS ET LEGUM: FESTSKRIFT TILL NILS JAREBORG 345 (Petter Asp et al. eds., 2002).
8 The greatest difficulty with this claim is to account for malum prohibitum offenses. For a
recent attempt, see R.A. Duff, Crime, Prohibition, and Punishment, 19 J. OF APPLIED PHIL. 97 (2002).
For a reply, see Douglas Husak, Malum Prohibitum and Retributivism, in DEFINING CRIMES: ESSAYS
ON THE CRIMINAL LAW'S SPECIAL PART (R.A. Duff& Stuart Green eds., 2005).
9 Thus it is odd that Feinberg, who famously defends an expressive theory of punishment,
appears to accept a preventive interpretation of the last resort principle. For a discussion of some of
the tensions between these two elements of Feinberg's thought, see Bernard Harcourt, Joel Feinberg
on Crime and Punishment: Exploring the Relationship Between The Moral Limits of the Criminal
Law and The Expressive Function of Punishment, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 145 (2001).
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and punishment are expressive-a less controversial (but hardly indisputable)
piece of conventional wisdom about our criminal justice system.
Punishment, however, is not the only possible way to stigmatize. It is a
contingent fact about contemporary societies that the hard treatment imposed on
persons who violate the criminal law is the conventional means by which
expressive functions are attained. One can certainly imagine rituals other than
hard treatment to express condemnation. l In closely-knit societies, devices other
than punishment (understood to include hard treatment) may have succeeded in
stigmatizing."' Most sentencing theorists, however, oppose alternative modes of
punishment that clearly express stigma but do not involve deprivations, such as
"shaming sanctions."' 2  In any event, it is important to remember that these
sanctions are alternative modes of punishment, not alternatives to punishment. If
these unusual kinds of punishment are deemed unacceptable, it is hard to believe
that stigma could be expressed effectively if punishment were abandoned
altogether. In the diverse liberal societies of today, the criminal sanction seems
uniquely suited to condemn. No formal mechanism is able to convey censure as
forcibly and directly.' 3 Although we should remain open-minded that other forms
of social control may do a better job than criminal sanctions at preventing given
forms of conduct, it seems less likely that alternatives could be more effective at
expressing condemnation.
More precisely, it seems less likely that alternative means of social control
that are acceptable may be more effective at expressing condemnation. It is
crucial to recognize that the foregoing conclusion-that the last resort principle is
of little significance in reducing the scope of the criminal sanction-is defensible
largely because we would never dream of invoking noncriminal alternatives that
might serve as well or better at preventing given kinds of conduct while expressing
condemnation. The fact that the criminal law strikes most of us as the only
acceptable means for the state to convey stigma indicates the moral progress we
have made as a society.
If we agree that punishments are designed to condemn as well as to prevent,
the last resort principle seems to do no significant work in a theory of
criminalization. Should we then reject the principle? A different possibility is
worthy of consideration. We might try to salvage the preventive interpretation of
10 Feinberg himself describes such alternatives, but somehow concludes that "the only way"
to vindicate the law is "to punish those who violate it." Feinberg, supra note 6, at 104. For a
discussion of this apparent inconsistency, see Hugo Adam Bedau, Feinberg's Theory of Punishment,
5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 103 (2001).
11 See R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 240-45 (1986).
12 For a defense of shaming sanctions, see Dan Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions
Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591 (1996). For a rejoinder, see Michael Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable
Punishment Policies in America, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1751 (1999).
13 At least, no formal mechanism that is universally available seems able to convey censure
as forcibly and directly. Criminal sanctions have the enormous advantage of being available in
virtually all circumstances.
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the last resort principle, and thus its potential usefulness in a theory of
criminalization, by attempting to limit the scope of expressive theories. Although
it is clear that persons who commit core offenses of the criminal law qualify for
censure, one might contend that the objective of some criminal laws is and ought to
be wholly preventive. Of course, the failure of these offenses to include an
expressive dimension is precisely what many commentators believe to be
objectionable about them. 14 As I have indicated, however, existing criminal law
has already expanded far beyond its core, and no longer seems to require moral
blame as a condition for liability.' 5
Theorists need not resign themselves to this development; they can help to
retard it without relying on expressive theories by including the last resort principle
in their theory of criminalization. This solution seems especially tempting in the
case of many white-collar crimes.' 6 It is hardly obvious, for example, that such
offenses as money laundering merit censure.' 7 Should these crimes be repealed?
Theorists who hope to preserve the expressive function of the criminal law will
probably answer in the affirmative. Commentators who are less confident about
expressive theories might be able to reach the same conclusion by appealing to the
last resort principle-assuming, of course, that alternative preventive devices can
be found. At the very least, the last resort principle seems more plausible when
applied to such examples than when invoked against cases of core criminality.
Arguably, then, the importance of the last resort principle might be salvaged for
that class of criminal laws that are not designed to give rise to censure or
condemnation, but are wholly preventive. At least some such laws may exist. A
few offenses, we might suppose, are nonstigmatizing and wholly preventive.
Statutes in this class are jeopardized if the last resort principle is included in our
theory of criminalization.
But a second and more straightforward challenge to the practical significance
of the last resort principle remains. Noncriminal means to reduce a crime like
rape-such as courses in self-defense for potential victims-can always
supplement, but need not replace, the criminal law. In fact, it is barely possible to
imagine a world in which only criminal prohibitions were used to reduce the
incidence of such conduct. What would such a world be like? Would we not
14 The enormous number of these offenses leads Andrew Ashworth to lament that the criminal
law has become a "lost cause." Andrew J. Ashworth, Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?, 116 L.Q.
REV. 225 (2000).
15 See Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH.
L. REv. 1269 (1998).
16 But it is hard to be sure. Commentators disagree about the conditions under which conduct
merits moral condemnation or censure. See Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag off a
Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533
(1997). For further thoughts, see Husak, supra note 8.
17 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2003) (which imposes up to ten years imprisonment on persons
who knowingly engage in a monetary transaction, for example, a bank deposit or withdrawal of funds
greater than $ 10,000 derived from specified unlawful activities).
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impose tort liability on rapists or educate our students to believe that rape is
wrongful? The criminal law can hardly be an effective deterrent unless it works in
tandem with other mechanisms of social control. In other words, the relevant
thought-experiment for testing the last resort principle must include a third
possible world for our consideration: a world in which both criminal and
noncriminal means are used. In most cases this third possible world, which
combines criminal and noncriminal strategies, would probably reduce the
incidence of the conduct in question more effectively than either of the previous
two.18 No sensible interpretation of the last resort principle would call for the
repeal of a criminal law that contributes to the prevention of harmful conduct, just
because criminal and noncriminal alternatives would be equally effective when
used alone. When preventing given kinds of conduct is imperative, we have good
reason to utilize all means at our disposal, including both criminal and noncriminal
devices. If I am correct, the last resort principle offers little hope of alleviating the
problem of overcriminalization.
III. AN APPLICATION: ILLICIT DRUG POSSESSION
The test of any principle is its implementation in practice. The difficulties I
have described are better appreciated by attending to particular cases than to
abstract generalities. I propose to consider a specific example-the crime of illicit
drug possession-to examine how the last resort principle might be applied.' 9 As
one might anticipate, no simple conclusions will be drawn. Each of the foregoing
problems in applying the last resort principle will resurface here. Our drug policy
urgently needs drastic reform. But anyone who believes that fundamental change
can be achieved by including the last resort principle in a theory of criminalization
must be prepared to address the hard questions I will raise here.
I select this example for several reasons. First, the application of the last
resort principle to drug proscriptions would seem to have the potential to bring
about enormous improvements in our system of criminal justice. At the present
time, drug offenses constitute the single most important manifestation of our
tendency to criminalize too much and to punish too many. Approximately 460,000
drug offenders are in jails and prisons across the country-about the same number
as the entire prison population in 1980.20 Nearly one of every four prisoners in
America is behind bars for a non-violent drug offense.2' Moreover, drug policy
18 Of course, this conjecture requires empirical support. For a possible counterexample to this
generalization, see my discussion of the forbidden fruit phenomenon in Part II infra.
19 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2002): "It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally
to possess a controlled substance .... State laws proscribe the same conduct.
20 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS tbl.6.1 (27th ed. 2000).
2 Id. attbls. 6.14. 6.23.
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has attracted increasing numbers of critics.22 Some of these critics have appealed
(implicitly or explicitly) to the last resort principle to challenge the status quo.
23
How would this principle be likely to alter our drug policy? Not much, I fear.
If my preceding conclusions about the last resort principle are correct, basic reform
is most likely to occur if proscriptions of drug possession are wholly preventive,
and lack an expressive function. I have suggested that those offenses with an
expressive dimension, which arguably comprise the entire universe of the criminal
law as it ought to be, are effectively immunized from change by the last resort
principle. No alternative state mechanism to censure drug users is likely to prove
acceptable.
But is the offense of illicit drug possession wholly preventive and
nonstigmatizing, or is it partly designed to convey condemnation? Unfortunately,
this is one of the most hotly contested points of debate between contemporary
prohibitionists and their critics. A number of commentators strongly denounce
illicit drug use in moral terms. Consider, for example, the perspective adopted by
James Q. Wilson: "If we believe-as I do-that dependency on certain mind-
altering drugs is a moral issue and that their illegality rests in part on their
immorality, then legalizing them undercuts, if it does not eliminate altogether, the
moral message.,, 24  William Bennett and Barry McCaffrey, the country's most
prominent drug czars, concur.25 Public opinion appears to support these views.26
Even those commentators who are less vocal in their moral reservations about
illicit drugs frequently oppose decriminalization on the ground that it would "send
the wrong message., 27 I assume these commentators should be understood to
claim that the criminalization and punishment of illicit drug possession is partly
expressive, communicating censure and reprobation.
22 The most concise challenge is posed by Ethan Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition in the United
States: Costs, Consequences and Alternatives, 245 SCIENCE 939 (1989). But the most common
complaint is not that criminal sanctions are applied, but that punishments for drug offenders are too
severe. See Douglas Husak, Desert, Proportionality, and the Seriousness of Drug Offenses, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY 187 (Andrew Ashworth & Martin Wasik eds., 1998).
23 See, e.g., JONATHAN SCHONSHECK, ON CRIMINALIZATION: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW (1994).
24 James Q. Wilson, Against the Legalization of Drugs, COMMENT. Feb. 1990, at 21, 26
(1990). More recently, see JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE 94 (1993).
25 See William Bennett, The Plea to Legalize Drugs Is a Siren Call to Surrender, in DRUGS IN
SOCIETY: CAUSES, CONCEPTS, AND CONTROL 339 (Michael D. Lyman & Gary W. Potter eds., 1991);
William Raspberry, Prevention and the Powers of Persuasion, WASH. POST, July 8, 1996, at A15.
26 Roughly two-thirds of Americans agree that illicit drug use is morally wrong. See the
several surveys described in Robert J. Blendon & John T. Young, The Public and the War on Illicit
Drugs, 279 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 827-32 (1998).
27 Two authors describe this as "the most frequent objection to harm reduction." See ROBERT
J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES: LEARNING FROM OTHER VICES, TIMES, AND
PLACES 388 (2001). President George W. Bush has remarked, "legalizing drugs would completely
undermine the message that drug use is wrong." See his announcement of the new head of the Office
of National Drug Control Policy (May 10, 2001).
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On the other hand, many drug policy critics emphatically reject the moral
condemnation expressed by Wilson. Some argue that illicit drug use is protected
by a moral right.28 Others prefer to understand drug abuse as a medical problem.29
These disagreements about the moral status of drug use are important. If no
censure for drug possession is warranted, we do not need the last resort principle to
object to impositions of criminal liability. Expressive theories do the job more
simply. I am unsure how we should decide whether the criminalization of illicit
drug possession is partly expressive or wholly preventive. Thus I remain uncertain
about the important question of whether the offense of illicit drug possession
serves an expressive function. Commentators who answer this question
affirmatively will remain convinced that our only (and not just our last) resort is to
continue to criminalize possession.
For several reasons, however, little progress is forthcoming even if we assume
that this offense is wholly preventive. The first problem is to identify exactly what
this offense is designed to prevent. This question raises yet another area of
intractable disagreement among drug policy theorists. In the case of core offenses
with an obvious expressive dimension, the nature of the harm to be prevented is
beyond dispute; the conduct to be prevented is identical to the conduct proscribed.
Clearly, arson is the conduct to be prevented by the crime of arson. When an
offense is inchoate, however, the conduct criminalized is not identical to the
conduct to be prevented. When the state criminalizes attempted murder, for
example, it is not really interested in decreasing the incidence of attempts-the
conduct actually proscribed-but rather the incidence of successful murders.
Which offenses are inchoate? 30 This question cannot be answered without a
catalogue of consummate harms the criminal law is designed to prevent.3 1
Although some existing offenses are very difficult to categorize as consummate or
inchoate, one point seems clear: the offense of drug possession cannot be a
consummate offense. Merely possessing something is almost never harmful. No
one would want to criminalize drug possession unless it created an unacceptable
risk of some subsequent harm, either to the user or to others.
What consummate harm is the offense of drug possession designed to
prevent? This question is also difficult. It is tempting to assume that the answer is
drug use.32 Most commentators gauge the success or failure of various policy
28 See THOMAS SZASZ, OUR RIGHT To DRUGS: THE CASE FOR A FREE MARKET (1992);
DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, DRUGS AND RIGHTS (1992).
29 See generally Alan I. Leshner, Addiction Is a Brain Disease, and It Matters, SCIENCE, Oct.
3, 1997, at 45.
30 For further thoughts, see Douglas N. Husak, The Nature and Justifiability of
Nonconsummate Offenses, 37 ARiz. L. REv. 151 (1995).
31 See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 133 (1978).
32 Remarkably, few jurisdictions actually punish drug use. I assume that this failure is due to
the fact that possession is easier to prove. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War
on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829 (2001).
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initiatives by examining their effects on rates of drug consumption.33 In other
words, the objective of drug proscriptions is what might be called use-reduction.
Of course, no one purports to curb use solely by relying on the criminal sanction.
Earlier, I suggested that noncriminal means to reduce given forms of conduct-
such as education--can always supplement, but need not replace, criminalization.
Why doubt that a combination of criminal and noncriminal strategies is the most
effective means to achieve the ultimate goal of drug policy-a reduction of the
consummate harm of drug use?
In fact, there are at least two plausible grounds for entertaining this very
doubt. The first challenge is the more basic. Can it really be true that use is the
consummate harm that drug proscriptions are designed to prevent? How can drug
use itself be a harm? Approximately 80 or 90 million living Americans have tried
an illicit drug at some point in their lives; as a group, they are not readily
distinguishable from the slightly larger population of abstainers.34 No harm need
occur on the literally tens of billions of occasions in which drugs have been
consumed. Drug use might increase the risk that some subsequent harm will
occur, but almost certainly is not harmful per se. In other words, a proscription of
drug use, no less than a proscription of drug possession, is an inchoate offense,
designed to reduce the risk of some other harm that use may cause. This train of
thought assigns a new and different objective to drug policy. The more appropriate
goal is harm-reduction.35 The best way to minimize harm may not be to proscribe
the use and possession of drugs.36
The existence of substitution effects provides powerful evidence that use-
reduction should not be endorsed as the ultimate objective of drug policy. Suppose
that punishment reduces the use of drug X. This conclusion would not
demonstrate the success of our drug policy if those persons who had been deterred
from X simply switched to an even more dangerous drug Y. The substitution
effects of drug prohibitions are unknown.3 7 But several commentators have
speculated that the development and popularity of hazardous substances like PCP
33 The Office of National Drug Control Policy (2002) lists "stopping use before it starts" as
the "number one priority" of national drug control strategy. See www.whitehousedrugpolicy.
gov/policy/ndcs.html.
34 Longitudinal studies of drug users provide the best evidence for this claim. The most well-
known such study is Jonathan Shedler & Jack Block, Adolescent Drug Use and Psychological
Health: A Longitudinal Study, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 612 (1990).
35 But which harms? Among the most frustrating aspect of contemporary drug policy is that
no clear rationale in its favor has ever been articulated by legal authorities. See Douglas Husak &
Stanton Peele, "One of the Major Problems of Our Society ": Symbolism and Evidence of Drug
Harms in U.S. Supreme Court Decisions, 25 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBLEMS 191 (1998).
36 Needle exchange programs are an example of a harm-reduction initiative that does not
penalize use.
37 According to one commentator, "one of the silver linings on the black cloud of greater drug
use under different legalization regimes is the prospect that less dangerous drugs would drive out the
more dangerous ones." Ethan A. Nadelmann, Thinking Seriously about Alternatives to Drug
Prohibition, in How TO LEGALIZE DRUGS 578, 590 (Jefferson M. Fish ed., 1998).
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and crack would not have occurred but for the criminalization of less dangerous
drugs.38 The very real possibility of substitution effects demonstrates that use
reduction. should not be accepted as the appropriate goal of drug policy.
Thus far, I have questioned whether use-reduction should be regarded as the
objective of our drug policy, and have proposed that harm-reduction might be a
more sensible goal. But even if we concede that use-reduction is our ultimate
objective, we still can challenge the claim that a combination of criminal and
noncriminal strategies is the most effective way to attain it. Perhaps drug
proscriptions provide an exception to my earlier generalization that criminal and
noncriminal strategies prevent given kinds of conduct more effectively than either
alternative alone. First, consider the forbidden fruit phenomenon. Many
individuals, most notably adolescents, are attracted to a kind of conduct precisely
because it is forbidden.39 These individuals are more likely to engage in given
behaviors that have been criminalized. Although all drug policy theorists
acknowledge the importance of the forbidden fruit phenomenon in explaining the
prevalence of drug use, its true extent is unknown. 40 Next, notice that the majority
of drug users quit voluntarily after a relatively brief period of experimentation-
typically, within five years of initial use.4' But millions have been arrested and
convicted, and punishment itself may raise the probability of subsequent drug use
by exacerbating criminogenic tendencies in the long run. Although sentences for
drug offenses are severe, no one proposes to keep users behind bars indefinitely.42
Because of their criminal records, drug offenders who have been incarcerated are
less likely to find housing or employment, to re-establish ties with families, or to
regain self-esteem.43  As a result, they may resume their use of drugs. If the
increase due to these factors were equal to or greater than the decrease due to
deterrence, criminal sanctions may actually bring about a net increase in use. 44
38 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Curing the Drug-Law Addiction: The Harmful Side Effects of
Legal Prohibition, in DRUGS: SHOULD WE LEGALIZE, DECRIMINALIZE, OR DEREGULATE? 155 (Jeffrey
Schaler ed., 1998).
39 The phenomenon is well confirmed in cases of ratings for sexual content and violence in
television and film. See Brad J. Bushman & Angela D. Stack, Forbidden Fruit Versus Tainted Fruit:
Effects of Warning Labels on Attraction to Television Violence, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
APPLIED 207 (1996).
40 "The drug research literature has no systematic research on the forbidden fruit hypothesis."
MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 27, at 89.
41 See id. at 16.
42 The Constitution, however, creates no barriers to life imprisonment for drug possession.
See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
43 The probability of many of these results is increased by the collateral consequences of drug
convictions. See Nora V. Demleitner, "Collateral Damage ": No Re-Entry For Drug Offenders, 47
VILL. L. REv. 1027 (2002).
44 In addition, the infliction of severe punishments to deter drug use may undermine social
stability by exacerbating the precursors to social disruption, thereby increasing crime and drug use in
the long run. See Tracy L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 191 (1999).
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This result is believable, since threats of punishment do not appear to be especially
effective in deterring drug use.4 5 These two hypotheses provide reason to suspect
that proscriptions of drug possession may not succeed in minimizing use. These
offenses may constitute an exception to the general rule that more prevention
occurs when criminal and noncriminal approaches are combined.
In this Part I have raised a number of difficulties in attempts to decide how the
last resort principle applies to the offense of drug possession. The issues I have
discussed involve empirical and theoretical controversies that are not likely to be
resolved anytime soon. We do not know whether proscriptions of drug possession
are designed to convey condemnation. Nor do we have much idea whether various
reforms would "send the wrong message." If this offense is designed to
stigmatize, the last resort principle will play no role in reforming our drug policy.
Arguably, however, the offense of drug possession is nonstigmatizing, but is
wholly preventive in function. Even so, however, the last resort principle will
prove exceedingly hard to apply, since we are not clear about exactly what it is this
offense is designed to prevent. In all probability, it is intended to reduce some
consummate harm other than use itself-although the nature of this harm has not
been clearly identified. In any event, it is hardly obvious that use needs to be
punished in order to reduce several of these harms. But even if this offense is
intended to prevent use, we cannot be confident that criminal sanctions will help to
do so. Perhaps more use, or at least more harmful use, occurs simply because
punishments are imposed. I have mentioned two mechanisms that might produce
this result.
IV. CONCLUSION
We do not have much basis to decide how applications of the last resort
principle would affect our drug policy. Although the details would differ from
case to case, I suspect that many of these same problems would reappear if the last
resort principle were applied elsewhere. These tremendous uncertainties provide
concrete reason to doubt that the last resort principle would have a substantial
impact on our system of criminal justice. None of these unresolved issues should
persuade us that the last resort principle should not be included in our theory of
criminalization. But they reinforce what I take to be Jareborg's pessimistic
conclusion: the last resort principle would not be especially helpful in retarding the
phenomenon of overcriminalization.
45 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Fagan, Do Criminal Sanctions Deter Drug Crimes?, in DRUGS AND
CRIME: EVALUATING PUBLIC POLICY INITIATIVES 188 (Doris Layton MacKenzie & Craig D. Uchida
eds., 1994).
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